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We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a
direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social
norm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism givers
fare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donor
welfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision
of the public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts
a light-handed regulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their
exemption from the popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show that contrary to
pure altruism, a more equal income distribution may produce more of the public good. In
fundraising campaigns where a social norm is not apparent, one may emerge endogenously
if donors are not too heterogeneous.
1. Introduction
Why do people give money to charity? One hypothesis is that people feel altruistic toward its recipients. Recent evidence,
however, suggests that giving is motivated mostly by social pressure and may lower donor’s welfare: ﬁeld experiments 
(Landry et al., 2006; Alpizar et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Lazear et al., 2012; Castillo et al., 2014;
Conte, 2014; Andreoni et al., forthcoming), the lab (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; 
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; Fong and Luttmer 2009; Reyniers and Bhalla, 2013), and the data (Meer, 
2011; Meer and Rosen, 2011; Scharf and Smith, 2014).1 To understand the evidence and its policy implications, we present 
an equilibrium theory of charitable giving in which donors experience social pressure from a direct solicitation. In doing so, 
we provide a possible microfoundation for the theory of warm-glow giving2 (Andreoni, 1990) and complement the existing 
explanations of conformity in a giving context (Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim 1994; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Andreoni and 
Bernheim 2009; Dillenberger and Sadowski, 2012; Gillen, 2015).3
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1 The presence of social pressure has also been identiﬁed in other contexts such as referee favoritism in soccer (Garicano et al., 2005), team work (Mas
and Moretti, 2009), and voter turnout (DellaVigna et al., 2014).
2 “Clearly social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a “warm glow” may play important roles in the decisions of agents.” (Andreoni, 1990;
p. 464).
“These [papers] provide the needed evidence to turn this ad hoc ﬁx [of warm-glow] into a solid foundation of human motivation.” (Andreoni, 2006;
p. 1223).
3 These studies on conformity formalize the idea that heterogeneous agents might follow a single behavior or “norm” if they value social status enough.
Akerlof’s explanation relies on discontinuity in utility while the rest rely on signaling, with the exception of Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) whose1
We build on the standard, purely altruistic model of giving in which individuals care only about the provision of the 
public good and their private consumption (Bergstrom et al., 1986). Giving decisions are simultaneous and anonymous. To 
this model, we introduce a social motive as in DellaVigna et al. (2012): if solicited in person, the individual receives disutility 
to the extent that his contribution falls short of a social norm, which may, for instance, be based on past contributions or 
the fundraiser’s suggested amount.4 A unique (Nash) equilibrium is shown to exist in this extended setting.
Our equilibrium analysis reveals that social pressure results in donations that are concentrated around the norm: donors 
who would anonymously give below the norm increase their donations and, relying on this increase, donors who would 
give above the norm reduce theirs. On balance, the added social motive improves the total amount raised for the public 
good. Despite this direct beneﬁt, some “social givers” who donate disproportionately fare worse than anonymous giving. In 
particular, with identical preferences, it is the least wealthy who are worse off and the most wealthy who are better off 
under social pressure. Clearly, if it were costless to avoid the solicitor, then no social giving would take place, rendering 
solicitations ineffective. When it is costly, however, the effective fundraising will target the middle income donors – those 
who would respond to social pressure but not avoid the solicitor. Extending this argument, we show that the provision of the 
public good grows (up to some limit) with the cost of avoiding the fundraiser. In other words, the increased social pressure 
alleviates the free-rider problem and in turn the underprovision of the public good; in fact, it may lead to overprovision. 
Our analysis therefore predicts that despite exerting social pressure, regulation of charitable solicitations is likely to be 
light-handed. This prediction is consistent with mild registration requirements for charities and their exemption from the 
popular Do Not Call list in the U.S.5 It is also consistent with organizations’ restriction – but occasional ban – on workplace 
solicitations.
The fact that social pressure countervails the free riding incentive may also reverse the well-known effect of an income 
redistribution on the provision of the public good. As proved by Bergstrom et al. (1986), all else equal, an income transfer 
from contributors to noncontributors lowers the provision in the standard model. We demonstrate that the same transfer 
increases the provision if donors worry suﬃciently about social pressure. This reversal in conclusion is important for policy 
because directly asking donors is viewed to be the most effective fundraising tool (Andreoni, 2006; Edwards and List, 
2014); as such, social pressure is likely to be present in most charitable campaigns. This view is further conﬁrmed by our 
investigation of mass campaigns. We establish that although donors may carry both altruistic and social motives to give, 
positive contributions must be purely social in a limit economy. The intuition is that in a limit economy, any remaining 
altruism – or concern for the charitable output – would create severe enough free riding to drive one’s contribution to 
zero.6 We further establish that if the social motive is suﬃciently strong, all donors conform to the norm despite their 
heterogeneity.
In our base model, the social norm is ﬁxed; perhaps, as mentioned above, it is set by past contributions or the fundrais-
er’s suggested amount. Even without an apparent norm though, people may experience social pressure since at least the 
solicitor observes their donations. We ﬁnd that if donors are not too heterogeneous, they all give the same – average – 
amount in equilibrium; in fact, multiple equilibria are possible. Our analysis therefore offers an endogenous theory of con-
formity in a giving context as well as a focal point argument for suggested donations. We predict that fundraisers with less 
heterogeneous donor bases such as colleges and religious organizations are more likely to make suggestions.7
Our theoretical results are in line with the evidence. In their door-to-door fundraising experiments, DellaVigna et al.
(2012) estimate that given the opportunity, 9 to 25% of the households avoided the fundraiser, which reduced total giving 
by 28 to 42%, especially by those who previously contributed less than $10. They also estimate that 75% of solicetees 
have no altruism toward the charities in question and conclude that door-to-door fundraising campaigns, on average, lower 
donor welfare. In a ﬁeld experiment during the Salvation Army’s annual campaign, Andreoni et al. (forthcoming) also found 
dramatic avoidance (and very rare seeking) of the solicitors during a direct ask. Furthermore, asking increased donations by 
75%. Since these ﬁeld experiments involve a relatively large number of donors, we believe that their estimates accord well 
with our limit results. We predict less avoidance (as a fraction of population) in lab experiments and workplace solicitations. 
As for our conformity results, Shang and Croson (2009) and Edwards and List (2014) observe that donations revolve around 
the suggested amount. Most notably, the percentage of donations above the suggested amount is substantially reduced 
relative to the control with no suggestion. In a different application of public good provision, Chen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that 
arguments are decision-theoretic. One key assumption in all of these studies is that any nonconforming action – low or high – is socially unacceptable.
This differs from our setting where high generosity is socially acceptable.
4 To be sure, DellaVigna et al. (2012) also offer a theoretical analysis but one without an equilibrium play, which is crucial to fully understand donor
behavior and policy.
5 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approves somewhere between 69 and 98% of applications for a charity status (98% for all instances where a decision
is rendered, 69% when withdrawn applications are included); see Reich et al. (2009). As for the popularity of the national Do-Not Call list, within 4 years of
its implementation in 2003, 72% of Americans had registered on it, and 77% of those reported a large drop in the number of telemarketing calls that they
receive; see the Economic Report of the President (2009, p. 244).
6 A similar result is found by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) and Yildirim (2014) within the reduced-form model of warm-glow giving a la Andreoni (1990).
7 If donors are suﬃciently heterogeneous, then there is a unique equilibrium in which at least one donor gives above and another gives below the
average.2
after receiving information about the median user’s total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 
530% increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62%.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we present the basic model and characterize its 
equilibrium. In Section 4, we examine comparative statics with respect to the cost of avoiding the solicitor, social norm, 
income distribution, and population size. We consider the endogenous social norm in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The model
The standard model of voluntary provision of public goods constitutes the benchmark for our analysis (Bergstrom et al., 
1986). We brieﬂy review this model before introducing social pressure.
Standard (altruistic) model of giving. There are n ≥ 2 individuals who each simultaneously allocate their respective 
wealth, wi > 0, between private consumption, xi ≥ 0, and a gift to the charity, gi ≥ 0. Units are normalized so that 
xi + gi = wi . Letting G =∑i gi be the supply of the public good or charity, ui(xi, G) represents individual i’s utility, which is 
strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice differentiable. Since individual i cares about contributions only through 
G , this standard setting is also called (purely) “altruistic” giving. Individual i’s (Marshallian) demand for the public good, de-
noted by f ai (w), is assumed to satisfy the strict normality: 0 < f
a′
i (w) ≤ θ < 1 for some parameter θ .9 Let (ga,∗1 , ga,∗2 , ..., ga,∗n )
denote the proﬁle of (Nash) equilibrium gifts. Under strict normality, such a proﬁle uniquely exists. By further assuming 
f ai (0) = 0, we guarantee a positive provision, Ga,∗ > 0.
Giving under social pressure. In the standard model, donors are informed of the charitable cause – perhaps, through 
media and the internet – but giving is anonymous.10 Suppose instead that the fundraiser solicits each donor directly. Thus, 
as identiﬁed in the literature discussed above, the donor may feel social pressure if his contribution falls short of a social 
norm or “rule”, gr . The norm may be based on the average of past contributions or the fundraiser’s suggested amount, for 
instance. Following DellaVigna et al. (2012), we assume that the associated social cost for donor i takes a linear form:
vi(gi) = si max{gr − gi,0}, (1)
where si ≥ 0 is the constant marginal cost of social pressure.11,12 The marginal cost si may be borne by internal feelings or 
external sanctions (as in López-Pérez, 2008),13 amplifying with the closeness of the solicitor’s social ties and shared charac-
teristics (Fong and Luttmer 2009; Meer, 2011), the exposure of giving to a wider audience (e.g., friends and colleagues), the 
duration of such exposure, etc. We assume that donor i’s utility when faced with the fundraiser is
usi (xi,G, gi) = ui(xi,G) − vi(gi). (2)
Evidently, if there is no norm, gr = 0, or the donor feels no pressure, si = 0, then there is no social cost either, or equiv-
alently, the donor acts as a pure altruist.14 The donor may also act as a pure altruist, however, if the norm is nonbinding 
for him. To focus our analysis on the latter – nontrivial – cases, we assume 0 < gr < wi and si > 0 for all i unless stated 
otherwise.
It is worth noting that the (social) utility in (2) is reminiscent of the (reduced-form) warm-glow speciﬁcation in Andreoni
(1990). This is not surprising since social pressure is a manifestation of warm-glow (see Footnote 2). The signiﬁcant dif-
ference is that in our context, whether a donor behaves as a pure altruist or warm-glow giver will be determined in 
equilibrium, thereby offering a possible microfoundation for the theory of warm-glow giving.
8 Relatedly, Reyniers and Bhalla (2013) observe that average donations for paired subjects are signiﬁcantly higher than the unpaired but the former are
also less happy with their donation decisions. Conte (2014) estimates that the access to social information about giving by others induces more generosity
from low altruism and less generosity from high altruism individuals.
9 The existence of parameter θ is not necessary for our analysis, but will make the role of social pressure transparent by ensuring a ﬁnite free-riding
level of the public good, Ga,0i , deﬁned below. It is also commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., Andreoni, 1988).
10 We use anonymous and altruistic giving interchangeably since they both correspond to the standard setting.
11 The linear social cost eases exposition but is not essential for our results. As shown in Appendix B, our results would continue to hold under a nonlinear
and differentiable social cost such as the quadratic form: vi(gi) = si
(
max{gr − gi ,0}
)2. In this sense, Andreoni and Bernheim’s (2009) critique of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for assuming kinked preferences is not valid in our model.
12 Conceivably, donors may also enjoy giving above the norm. We abstract from this motive here to isolate social pressure as the sole source of warm-glow.
Our model would, however, easily extend. Let usi (xi , G, gi) = ui(xi , G) − si(gr − gi) where si = sbi if gi ≤ gr and si = sai if gi > gr . For sai < sbi , our qualitative 
results with sai = 0 hold, though the norm-conformity would be less pronounced owing to the reduced free-riding incentive. For sai ≥ sbi , social pressure 
becomes nonbinding for the giving decision, which is inconsistent with the evidence alluded to in the Introduction.
13 In López-Pérez (2008), however, si is conditional on others’ compliance decisions, which is more in line with our endogenous norm treatment in 
Section 5.
14 Even without an apparent norm, an endogenous one may form in equilibrium, depending on donors’ expectations of the average donation, for instance.
We examine this interesting possibility in Section 5.3
3. Equilibrium characterization
Let (gs,∗1 , g
s,∗
2 , ..., g
s,∗
n ) and G
s,∗ = ∑i gs,∗i denote the proﬁle of equilibrium gifts and the total provision under social
pressure, respectively. To characterize, consider person i’s gift choice given others’, G−i . Ignoring the nonnegativity of social 
cost for now, person i’s program can be written:
max
xi,gi
ui(xi,G) − si(gr − gi) (3)
s.t. xi + gi = wi .
Inserting gi = G − G−i , (3) can be re-written:
max
G≥G−i
ui(wi + G−i − G,G) − si(gr + G−i − G). (4)
For a positive contribution (or nonbinding constraint G ≥ G−i), the ﬁrst-order condition becomes,15
d
dG
ui(wi + G−i − G,G) + si = 0. (5)
Let the solution to (5) be
G = f si (wi + G−i, si), (6)
where it follows from normality that 0 < ∂ f si /∂wi < 1 and ∂ f
s
i /∂si > 0. The ﬁrst derivative signiﬁes the usual crowd-out 
effect due to altruism while the second signiﬁes the increased generosity due to social pressure.
In public good games such as this one, it is often more convenient to write the optimal gift as a function of the total 
contribution, G , rather than G−i . To this end, we invert f si and express (6) as: φ
s
i (G; si) = wi + G−i . Clearly, G ≥ f si (wi, si), 
∂φsi /∂G > 1 and ∂φ
s
i /∂si < 0. Substituting for G−i = G − gi , we obtain i’s gift under social pressure:
gi = wi + G − φsi (G; si) ≡ Rsi (G). (7)
Not surprisingly, this gift is dictated by both altruistic and social motives as it is decreasing in G and increasing in si . If social 
pressure is nonconcerning for person i, i.e., gi > gr , then he only maximizes his altruistic utility, ui , which is equivalent to 
setting si = 0 in (3). This yields i’s altruistic gift:
gi = wi + G − φai (G) ≡ Rai (G), (8)
where φai (G) ≡ φsi (G; 0). Clearly, Rsi (G) > Rai (G). Combining (7) and (8) with the nonnegativity of social cost, we can state 
person i’s “reaction” function, which is also depicted in Fig. 1.
Lemma 1. Given the total provision G, person i’s optimal gift is given by:
gsi (G) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Rai (G) if f
a
i (wi) ≤ G < Ga,ri
gr if Ga,ri ≤ G < Gs,ri
Rsi (G) if G
s,r
i ≤ G < Gs,0i
0 if Gs,0i ≤ G,
(9)
where the unique critical levels of the public good solve the norm-conformity and free-riding conditions: Rai (G) = gr = Rsi (G) and 
Rai (G) = 0 = Rsi (G), implying Ga,ri < Ga,0i , Gs,ri ≤ Gs,0i . Moreover, gsi (G) is continuous; (a) weakly decreasing in G; and (b) weakly 
increasing in the norm, gr and in the marginal social cost, si .
Being the total, G cannot be less than the stand-alone contributions – i.e., G ≥ f ai (wi) and G ≥ f si (wi, si). In addition, 
the free-riding incentive implies a decreasing optimal gift in G . If the total contribution is suﬃciently low, G < Ga,ri , i’s 
contribution exceeds the social norm, gr , and coincides with his altruistic choice, Rai (G). If the total contribution is moderate, 
Ga,ri ≤ G < Gs,ri , i’s contribution conforms to the norm: in this case, ignoring the social cost would lead to too low an 
altruistic gift whereas accounting for the social cost would dictate a gift unnecessarily topping the norm. Finally, if the total 
contribution is suﬃciently high, G > Gs,ri , i’s contribution falls strictly below g
r and follows his social giving, Rsi (G). The 
person free rides whenever G grows beyond Gs,0i , although it is possible that G
s,0
i = ∞ so the person always contributes 
15 The second-order condition is satisﬁed due to strict quasi-concavity of ui .4
Fig. 1. Giving under social pressure.
some under social pressure – a behavior that will be especially relevant in large economies in Section 4.4.16 It is worth 
emphasizing that the critical levels of the public good in Lemma 1 are determined solely by person i’s own preferences, 
income, and the norm. Eqs. (7) and (8) reveal that all four critical levels are increasing in wealth, wi , with the social levels, 
Gs,ri , and G
s,0
i , increasing in the marginal cost, si , too.
From Lemma 1, Proposition 1 is immediate.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium under social pressure. In equilibrium,
(a) ga,∗i < g
s,∗
i implies g
s,∗
i ≤ gr , whereas ga,∗i ≥ gr implies ga,∗i ≥ gs,∗i .
(b) Gs,∗ is weakly increasing in the norm, gr .
As in the standard model, the uniqueness of equilibrium under social pressure obtains from decreasing reaction functions. 
Part (a) of Proposition 1 says that if a person responds to social pressure, then his anonymous or altruistic contribution must 
be “small”: ga,∗i < g
r .17 Under social pressure, such a giver will at most meet the norm to minimize social cost. If, on the
other hand, a person is already generous, he actually gives less under pressure! The reason is that a generous person 
partially free rides on the increased social giving by others. Combining these observations, part (a) suggests that compared 
to anonymous gifts, gifts under social pressure are likely to be less heterogeneous, revolving around the norm. Notice that 
unlike the extant theories of conformity, e.g., Bernheim (1994), conformity in our setting arises despite no social pressure 
for high generosity.18 In addition, it is consistent with the evidence on charitable giving that donations are concentrated 
around the fundraiser’s suggested amount; see, e.g., Shang and Croson (2009), Chen et al. (2010), and Edwards and List
(2014).
Part (b) of Proposition 1 shows that by pressuring more donors, a higher social norm raises total provision. This is easily 
seen from Lemma 1: since person i’s optimal gift, gsi (G), is decreasing in G and increasing in g
r , if a higher norm meant 
lower total giving, then each person would contribute more and generate a greater total, which is a contradiction. Social 
norm, however, has no marginal effect on the total provision once the latter becomes suﬃciently large, i.e., Gs,∗ ≥ Gs,ri for 
all i. This observation points to the existence of a revenue-maximizing norm in settings where it is based on the fundraiser’s 
suggested amount – an issue we address in Section 4.2. A direct implication of part (b) is that with respect to anonymous 
giving, face-to-face solicitations cannot reduce the money raised, though, as the next Corollary indicates, they may be 
inconsequential, i.e., Gs,∗ = Ga,∗ , if everyone is already generous.
16 In contrast, for a pure altruist, the free-riding level, Ga,0i , is ﬁnite, which is ensured by the (standard) assumption that f
a′
i (w) is bounded away from 1.
17 It is tempting to conclude that the converse of this statement is also true – but it is not: expecting an increase in total giving, a person with a small
anonymous contribution may be even less generous under social pressure if he cares little about pressure. The intuitive conclusion is, however, true under
identical preferences: if 0 < ga,∗i < g
r , then ga,∗i < g
s,∗
i ≤ gr .
18 A quadratic social cost, vi(gi) = si(gr − gi)2, for instance, would create social pressure for all deviations from the norm. It is, however, hard to imagine 
that high generosity would be socially unacceptable.5
Corollary 1 (Inconsequential fundraising). If ga,∗i ≥ gr for all i, then Gs,∗ = Ga,∗ . Moreover, if 0 < ga,∗i < gr for some i, then 
Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ .
Intuitively, for face-to-face solicitations to be consequential and generate more funds, social pressure must be a concern 
for some donors, i.e., ga,∗i < g
r . In addition, if all concerned donors are not free-riders to begin with, fundraising is indeed 
consequential. In order to keep the analysis nontrivial in the sequel, we assume that this is the case; namely Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ .19
Speciﬁcally, we impose
Assumption 1. 0 < ga,∗i < g
r for some i.
Note that the increased provision of the public good due to social pressure directly beneﬁts everyone. Whether a speciﬁc 
donor is better off than anonymous giving, however, depends also on the social cost borne. The following two propositions 
provide insights into this key comparison for donor welfare. Let ua,∗i and u
s,∗
i be person i’s equilibrium utilities under 
anonymous and social giving, respectively.
Proposition 2. (a) If ga,∗i ≥ gr , then us,∗i > ua,∗i ; (b) if ga,∗i < gr and ga,∗j ≥ gr , ∀ j 	= i, then us,∗i < ua,∗i .
Part (a) of Proposition 2 says that generous donors favor face-to-face fundraising since it pressures the less generous. 
Put differently, if a donor dislikes fundraising, his anonymous gift must be small, ga,∗i < g
r . Although the converse of this 
statement does not follow in general, part (b) identiﬁes one environment in which it does: if there is a single donor whose 
anonymous gift is below the norm, that donor dislikes fundraising as he stands to be the sole “reluctant” giver that everyone 
else free rides on.20 Proposition 3 extends this environment to multiple reluctant givers under identical preferences: the less 
wealthy donors opt for anonymous giving whereas the more wealthy opt for fundraising.
Proposition 3 (Identical preferences). Suppose that ui = u and si = s for all i. Also suppose ga,∗i > 0 for all i. Then, (a) (Bergstrom et al., 
1986) ua,∗i = ua,∗ , (b) us,∗i is weakly increasing in wi, and thus (c) there exists a cutoff wealth w∗ such that us,∗i −ua,∗ =sign wi −w∗ .
Proposition 3 follows because all else equal, the less wealthy have lower demand for the public good, making them 
especially vulnerable to pressure giving. The more wealthy, on the other hand, are less worried about meeting the social 
norm but they would enjoy the increased giving by the less wealthy. The comparison of donor welfare in Proposition 3 is 
facilitated by a well-known neutrality result due to Bergstrom et al. (1986): as recorded in part (a), if individuals possess 
identical preferences and they are all anonymous contributors, i.e., ga,∗i > 0, then they have the same public and private good 
consumption, resulting in the same utilities, irrespective of income heterogeneity; formally, xa,∗ = wi − ga,∗i = φa(Ga,∗) −Ga,∗
and ua,∗i = u(xa,∗, Ga,∗). The presence of social pressure breaks such neutrality: the richer the donor the (weakly) better 
off he is.21 Combining the two ﬁndings, the welfare comparison takes the form of a cutoff wealth, which is reported in 
part (c).22
4. Comparative statics
Armed with the equilibrium characterization, we now examine how giving behavior, solicitation strategy, and donor
welfare might vary with the cost of avoiding the solicitor, social norm, income distribution, and population size, respectively.
4.1. Avoiding the ask
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest an important donor behavior identiﬁed in the experimental literature: sorting in and out of 
facing the solicitor. To examine this choice, suppose that upon being notiﬁed by the fundraiser, donor i has the opportunity 
to avoid solicitation at a (utility) cost ci and donate, if he wishes, by alternative, impersonal means such as via direct mail 
or online. Suppose also that donors make such decisions (as well as how much to give) simultaneously. The following result 
shows that the two polar regimes of all giving through the fundraiser and all giving anonymously can indeed be equilibrium 
outcomes of endogenous sorting.
19 This assumption is reasonable also because fundraisers often know their donor proﬁles (as assumed in our model) and would not approach them unless
they anticipate an increase in giving.
20 By the same logic, such a donor would favor fundraising only if there were other social givers he could free ride on.
21 The neutrality result is restored if the source of social norm is suggested donations and the fundraiser could personalize them. To see this, note from
(7) that if everyone gives under pressure, then, in equilibrium, gs,∗i = wi + Gs,∗ − φs(Gs,∗; s) and thus xs,∗ = φs(Gs,∗; s) − Gs,∗ . It is revenue-maximizing for 
the fundraiser to suggest gri = gs,∗i since it generates the total Gs,∗ .
22 Whether or not w∗ is interior, however, depends on the speciﬁc income distribution (and preferences). As implied by Proposition 2, w∗ is interior if 
incomes and therefore altruistic gifts are suﬃciently heterogeneous.6
Proposition 4. If the cost of avoiding the ask is large enough, namely ci > si gr , for all i, then every donor giving through the fundraiser 
is the unique equilibrium, yielding Gs,∗. If, on the other hand, ci is positive but suﬃciently small for all i, then donors who altruistically 
give below the norm, ga,∗i < g
r , avoid the fundraiser and those who give above the norm, ga,∗i ≥ gr , seek the fundraiser, yielding the
altruistic provision Ga,∗ as the unique equilibrium.
Intuitively, each donor chooses to face the fundraiser if avoiding her is costlier than social pressure. On the other hand, 
if the fundraiser can be easily avoided, then those who consider giving a small amount and thus expect social pressure will 
sort out for alternative means of giving whereas those who consider giving signiﬁcantly will seek the fundraiser. Since, in 
equilibrium, no donor gives in to social pressure, the purely altruistic provision obtains.
Clearly, if the fundraiser anticipated no increase in the total giving, she would not spend any resources contacting people. 
Proposition 4 therefore points to a tradeoff between fundraising and donor sorting it induces. To explore this tradeoff, 
consider again the case of identical preferences and assume c < sgr so that some donors may sort out. Also in order to rule 
out the trivial strategy of contacting all donors, assume that the fundraiser incurs a positive but negligible cost, ε > 0, at 
each contact, e.g., sending a ﬂyer.23 Note that for a cost-saving fundraiser, soliciting everyone may not be optimal because, 
as implied by Proposition 3, anticipating a greater social pressure cost, the least wealthy are likely to avoid her. Soliciting 
the very rich may not be optimal either, because their giving is immune to social pressure. Consequently, the fundraiser 
would target the middle income individuals!
To formalize this observation, consider the following modiﬁed game of fundraising, which is consistent with the ﬁeld 
experiment by DellaVigna et al. (2012):
• The fundraiser privately notiﬁes a subset of donors for a face-to-face solicitation, each costing ε > 0.
• The contacted donors simultaneously decide whether or not to avoid the fundraiser at a (utility) cost c.
• Finally, without observing the sorting decisions of others, everyone contributes – either through the fundraiser or
through impersonal means, if he wants to.
The equilibrium characterization of this game is more involved than that of Proposition 3 because both the solicitation set 
and donors’ decisions to remain anonymous are endogenized. We assume that donors hold “passive” beliefs: each attributes 
a (off-equilibrium) solicitation or nonsolicitation by the fundraiser to a “mistake” that is limited to him.24 To facilitate the 
analysis, we also assume additively separable utility, i.e., uxG = 0, to ensure that the incentive to remain anonymous is 
monotonically weaker for wealthier donors and that no two donors have equal wealth to avoid a trivial multiplicity in the 
solicitation set.
Proposition 5. Consider the fundraising game just described and assume identical preferences. In equilibrium, there exist two unique 
cutoff wealths wl ≤ wh such that donor i is solicited if and only if wi ∈ [wl, wh]. Moreover, as the cost of avoidance increases from c
to c′ , (a) more donors are solicited: [wl, wh] ⊆ [wl′ , wh′ ]; and (b) the total contribution increases: Gs,∗ ≤ Gs,∗′ .
Proposition 5 conﬁrms our prediction that a cost-saving solicitor will approach only the middle income donors25; and in 
response, these donors will give more generously. Compared to anonymous giving, all unsolicited donors are better off at 
the expense of the solicited.26 Not surprisingly, the solicited donors would prefer a higher avoidance cost for others since 
this would motivate the solicitor to contact a larger group of donors. This implies that the fundraiser will collect the highest 
amount when the cost of avoidance is suﬃciently large and the lowest amount when it is negligible, which is in line with 
Proposition 4.27
Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that donors are likely to receive uninvited solicitations that raise their cost of avoidance. 
To alleviate their exposure to social pressure, several researchers have recommended a “Do-Not Call” or “Do-Not Solicit” 
list for charities (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012; Lazear et al., 2012). Indeed, if donors could limit direct charitable appeals 
through such a list at a minimal cost, we know from Proposition 4 that no donor would give due to social pressure – the 
less generous donors would opt out and the more generous would at worst be indifferent.28 Interestingly though, the U.S. 
23 See Name-Correa and Yildirim (2013) and Name-Correa (2014) for an analysis of charitable fundraising that involves signiﬁcant solicitation costs but
no social pressure or sorting decisions for donors.
24 Passive beliefs are commonly used in bilateral contracting in which one party privately contracts with several others (e.g., McAfee and Schwartz 1994).
One justiﬁcation in our context is that different solicitors contact different donors so that solicitation mistakes are perceived to be uncorrelated.
25 If, unlike in our model, there were no alternative, impersonal means to give, the solicitor would also approach the high income donors and expand her
list of contacts, setting wh =maxi wi and reducing wl in Proposition 5; however, the total provision may or may not increase since those opting out would 
now give nothing.
26 Not all solicited donors are necessarily worse off, however, due to the increased provision.
27 From the proof of Claim A.2 in the Appendix, it follows that donor i avoids the solicitor if and only if ci < c∗i where c
∗
i = u∗i (S∗) − udi (S∗) – the payoff 
difference between opting in and unilaterally opting out when the equilibrium solicitation set is S∗. Using uxG = 0, it is veriﬁed that c∗i is decreasing in wi .
It can also be veriﬁed that ﬁxing c, wl is increasing in s – more avoidance by the lower income donors – but wh is ambiguous due to s’s positive effect on
social giving and negative effect on the number of social givers.
28 In particular, the rich are expected to vote against such a list whereas the poor are expected to vote for it.7
laws have exempted charities from Do Not Call registries (see Footnote 5). One argument in favor of such leniency could be 
that personal appeals by fundraisers mitigate the free-rider problem and improve donors’ collective welfare as a result. We 
evaluate the merit of this argument next.
4.2. Social norm and donor welfare
For ease of exposition, we consider identical donors in this subsection and illustrate its main point ﬁrst by a Cobb–
Douglas example where
u(x,G) = (1− α) ln x+ α lnG.
Suppose that the cost of avoiding the solicitor is large enough so that donors do not sort out of facing the solicitor. Also 
suppose s > 1−αw−gr . Then, the equilibrium gift under fundraising is found to be
gs,∗ =
{
ga,∗ = αwα+(1−α)n if gr < ga,∗
gr if gr ≥ ga,∗. (10)
To compare, we determine the eﬃcient gift by maximizing the utilitarian welfare:29
ge = argmax
g
nu(w − g,ng),
which yields ge = αw . Clearly, ge > ga,∗ so there is the usual underprovision without direct solicitations. If the social norm 
is suﬃciently low, gr < ga,∗ , solicitations are inconsequential in that gs,∗ = ga,∗ , which implies too low donor welfare, 
ua,∗ < ue . If the norm is suﬃciently high, gr ≥ ga,∗ , donors conform with the norm and incur no cost of social pressure in 
equilibrium. The increased giving improves donor welfare as long as the norm is not too high: ua,∗ < us,∗ ≤ ue if ga,∗ < gr ≤
ge . If, however, gr > ge , there will be overprovision of the public good! This also leads to too low donor welfare, us,∗ < ue; 
in fact, it is possible that us,∗ < ua,∗ .30 That is, when the norm is too demanding, donors end up giving too much to the 
solicitor and become worse off than voluntary giving. Proposition 6 conﬁrms these observations more generally.
Proposition 6. Suppose that donors are identical and that the cost of avoiding the solicitor is large enough. Then, there exists a cutoff 
social norm go(s) > ga,∗ such that equilibrium gift under fundraising is
gs,∗ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ga,∗ if gr < ga,∗
gr if ga,∗ ≤ gr < go(s)
go(s) if go(s) ≤ gr < w.
Moreover, for a suﬃciently large s, there is another cutoff gc ∈ (ge, go(s)) such that us,∗ > ua,∗ if ga,∗ < gr < gc; and us,∗ < ua,∗ if 
gr > gc .
Proposition 6 adds to the Cobb–Douglas example that in general, very low and very high social norms do not change 
giving behavior even though the latter raises social cost for donors. This implies that a revenue-maximizing solicitor should 
suggest a moderate donation.31 To the extent that her suggested amount alleviates the problem of underprovision, it will 
also improve donor welfare. Nevertheless, Proposition 6 indicates that the solicitor may induce donors with intense social 
motive to give too much.
4.3. Income redistribution and public good provision
A major policy issue in public economics is to understand the impact of an income redistribution on public good pro-
vision. Within the standard model, Warr (1983) was the ﬁrst to show that a small redistribution of income among the 
contributors (or among the noncontributors) leaves the provision unchanged. Extending this neutrality result, Bergstrom 
et al. (1986) proved that with identical preferences, a small wealth transfer from contributors to noncontributors strictly 
diminishes the supply of the public good (see their Theorem 5(v)). The intuition is that by strict normality, the original 
contributor reduces his gift by more than the transfer whereas the original noncontributor increases his gift by less than 
the transfer by allocating some to his private consumption. The presence of social pressure can reverse this prediction as 
the following proposition demonstrates.
29 Andreoni (2006, pp. 1224–7) contains a compelling argument as to why nonpecuniary motives for giving such as social pressure should not be included
in social welfare.
30 Indeed, us,∗ < ua,∗ for α < 12 and g
r > w − ga,∗ .
31 Implicit in this moderation is the (reasonable) assumption that raising the same total, the fundraiser would not want to pressure donors unnecessarily.
Based on a fairness-based equilibrium concept, Dale and Morgan (2010) also ﬁnd that asking for too much giving can be as discouraging for donors as
asking for too little and that moderate suggested donations produce modest positive gains.8
Proposition 7. Suppose that preferences are identical and that individuals i and j in the population have wealths wi > w j and 
altruistic gifts ga,∗j = 0 < ga,∗i < gr . Then, a wealth-equalizing transfer  ∈ (0, wi−w j2 ] from i to j strictly lowers the public good
(Bergstrom et al., 1986). Under the social pressure setting, however, the same transfer can never decrease the public good if social 
pressure is suﬃciently intense, i.e., s > sl , and strictly increases it if s ∈ (sl, sh) for some cutoffs 0 < sl < sh.
Proposition 7 follows because the presence of social pressure makes contributions imperfect substitutes and thus less 
responsive to each other. In particular, if he cares enough about the pressure, the richer individual continues to give at the 
norm after the transfer – rather than reducing his gift; see Fig. 1 and recall that Rs(G) shifts upward with a higher s.32
The signiﬁcance of Proposition 7 is that the direct ask is considered by both charities and donors to be the most powerful 
fundraising technique (Andreoni, 2006; Edwards and List, 2014). Indeed, as we examine next, social pressure is likely to be 
the predominant motive in large fundraising campaigns such as those run by the Salvation Army.
4.4. Limit economies and pure pressure giving
It is well established in the literature that under purely altruistic giving, individual contribution becomes negligible in a 
limit economy even though the total contribution remains signiﬁcant (Andreoni, 1988). This means that in a limit economy, 
personal appeals to give are bound to create mixed charitable motives. The natural question then is: does social pressure 
become the sole charitable motive? Rephrasing, can a donor still carry some altruism or concern for the charitable output 
in a large economy?
Almost by deﬁnition, the answer to the latter question is “no” if individual giving grows to be unresponsive to the level 
of the public good; that is, if ∂ gi(G)/∂G → 0 as G → ∞. The following lemma indicates that this must be the case for a 
donor who continues to contribute a positive amount.
Lemma 2. Suppose that limG→∞ gi(G) > 0. Then, limG→∞ ∂ gi(G)/∂G = 0.
Lemma 2 reveals that in a limit economy, any signiﬁcant contribution must be dictated purely by social pressure.33
Conversely, in a limit economy, any residual altruism must cause severe enough free-riding to discourage giving – a point 
also made by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) and Yildirim (2014).34
To complete our understanding of Lemma 2, we next determine the limit contribution. Recall from Proposition 1 that if 
an altruistic gift is below the norm (which is necessarily the case in a large economy), it will at most meet the norm due 
to social pressure. From Lemma 1, equilibrium gift is therefore either gr or max{wi + G − φsi (G; si), 0}, whichever is lower, 
leading us to deﬁne the following limit gift:
gi =min{i, gr}, (11)
where i = limG→∞ max{wi + G − φsi (G; si), 0}. Clearly, i = max{wi − xi(si), 0} where xi(si) represents the individual’s 
demand for private consumption. It can be veriﬁed from the properties of inverse demand φsi that x
′
i(si) < 0, xi(0) = ∞, and
limsi→∞ xi(si) = 0. Consequently, gi can be expressed more explicitly as:
gi =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if si ≤ x−1i (wi)
wi − xi(si) if x−1i (wi) < si ≤ x−1i (wi − gr)
gr if x−1i (wi − gr) < si .
(12)
To understand (12), observe that a purely altruistic donor, i.e., si = 0, will free ride at very high levels of the public good. 
Eq. (12) says that this behavior persists so long as social pressure is not too concerning for the donor. Otherwise, even in a 
limit economy, the donor will make a positive contribution that is increasing in si until it reaches the norm. To demonstrate, 
consider the Cobb–Douglas example in Section 4.2. It is easily veriﬁed that φs(G; s) = G + (1−α)Gα+sG and hence x(s) = 1−αs and 
g =min{max{w − 1−αs , 0}, gr}. In particular, g = gr whenever w − 1−αs ≥ gr , as assumed in that example.35
Armed with the limit gift, we are now ready to characterize limit economies. To do so, we call donor i of type t if, under 
fundraising, his free-riding level of the public good is Gs,0(t). Note that two donors with different preferences and incomes 
can have the same free-riding levels.
32 Within the altruistic model, Cornes and Hartley (2007, Corollary 4.1) also show the nonneutrality of an income redistribution if the price of giving
varies across donors. Their result relies on a substitution effect whereas, assuming identical preferences and the same price of giving, ours exploits an
income effect.
33 This does not mean, of course, that the individual has no altruistic motive; it just ceases to be effective.
34 These authors study a canonical model of warm-glow giving a la Andreoni (1990) to identify the dominant motive (altruism vs. warm-glow) and
crowding out in a limit economy, but they do not characterize the limit gift itself, which is important here to assess the norm-conformity.
35 Maximizing utility without altruism: maxg(1 − α) ln(w − g) − s(gr − g), we indeed obtain the pure social gift: g = w − 1−αs .9
Proposition 8. Without loss of generality, let Gs,0(1) > Gs,0(2) > ... > Gs,0(T ) be donor types and γt 	= 0 be the ﬁxed proportion of 
type t in the economy. Then, as population size increases to inﬁnity, (a) only type 1 donors contribute, and (b) gs,∗i → gi for type 1 
donors.
Part (a) of Proposition 8 states that only the most “willing” donors will make a positive contribution in a limit economy 
– a fact that was ﬁrst established by Andreoni (1988) in a purely altruistic model. Part (b) says that individual contribution
for the most willing converges to the limit gift, gi , in (12). Consequently, social pressure must be the sole motive behind 
positive contributions in a large economy. Note that depending on donors’ aversion to social pressure, heterogeneous con-
tributions may be observed in a large economy, with a concentration at the social norm. In particular, it is possible that all 
contributing donors conform with the norm if each cares suﬃciently about social pressure, i.e., if si > x
−1
i (wi − gr) for all 
type 1 donors.
5. Endogenous social norm
Up to now, we have assumed social norm is exogenous; perhaps, it is based on past contributions or suggestion by the 
fundraiser. There are, however, many charitable appeals with no obvious norms. This might be because past contributions 
are not publicized; the solicitor adopts a strategy that “every penny counts”; or the charitable cause is simply new. Even so, 
the solicited donors are likely to form expectations about the socially acceptable level of giving since their contributions are 
observed at least by the fundraiser – if not announced later. In this section, we consider one such expectation: the average 
donation, Gn . Speciﬁcally, we assume that a donor feels social pressure to the extent that his gift falls short of the average. 
Formally, we write donor i’s social cost:
vi(gi) = si max{G
n
− gi,0}. (13)
Comparing (13) with (1), two differences from the case of exogenous norm seem immediate. First, a single donor never 
incurs a social cost as his contribution becomes the norm. More generally, contributing one more dollar reduces the social 
cost by less than a dollar since it also moves the average up. Thus, we predict that the endogenous norm discourages giving. 
Second, endogenous norm introduces complementarity between contributions since one’s social pressure is exacerbated by 
others’ increased contribution. As such, we also predict that unlike in the case of exogenous norm, equilibrium gifts need 
not be unique. To make these points precise, we modify (4) by substituting gr = Gn :
max
G≥G−i
ui(wi + G−i − G,G) − si(G
n
+ G−i − G).
Differentiating with respect to G at an interior solution, we have the ﬁrst-order condition for the pressure gift:
d
dG
ui(.) + n− 1
n
si = 0. (14)
Eq. (14) coincides with (5) except that with endogenous norm, the marginal cost of social pressure is discounted by n−1n , re-
ﬂecting the donor’s concern for raising the norm. Therefore, letting si ≡ n−1n si , the solution to (14) readily obtains from (7):
gi = wi + G − φsi (G; si) ≡ Rsi (G). (15)
Clearly, R
s
i (G) < R
s
i (G), conﬁrming that the endogenous norm discourages social giving. On the other hand, if the social
norm is nonbinding for an individual, i.e., gi >
G
n , his sole motive is altruism, in which case his gift remains as in (8). Using 
(15) and (8), we ﬁnd individual i’s reaction function; see Fig. 2.
Lemma 3. Given the total provision G, person i’s optimal gift is given by:
gsi (G) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Rai (G) if f i(wi) ≤ G < G
a
i
G
n if G
a
i ≤ G < Gsi
R
s
i (G) if G
s
i ≤ G < Gs,0i
0 if G
s,0
i ≤ G,
(16)
where the unique critical levels of the public good solve the norm-conformity and free-riding conditions: Rai (G) − Gn = 0 = R
s
i (G) − Gn
and Rai (G) = 0 = R
s
i (G), implying G
a
i < G
0
i , G
s
i ≤ Gs,0i . Moreover, gsi (G) is continuous; (a) non-monotonic in G; and (b) weakly
increasing in the marginal cost of pressure, si , and in the number of donors, n.10
Fig. 2. Average donation as the norm.
The qualitative difference between Lemmas 1 and 3 arises for the levels of the public good at which the donor gives 
according to the norm. Under the endogenous norm, an increase in G in this region also increases the individual gift in 
order to match the rising average. As noted above, such complementarity between contributions create the potential for 
multiple equilibria and in turn multiple norms, as we establish next.
Proposition 9. Under fundraising with an endogenous norm, (a) if maxi G
a
i ≤mini Gsi , then every equilibrium is characterized by each
person giving the same – average – amount: gs,∗i = G
s,∗
n and the total provision: G
s,∗ ∈ [maxi Gai , mini Gsi ]; (b) if maxi Gai >mini Gsi ,
then the unique equilibrium involves at least one donor giving strictly above and another giving strictly below the average.
From Lemma 3 and Fig. 2, it is evident that giving exactly the average amount is a best response for everyone if G lies 
in between G
a
i and G
s
i for all i – hence the condition maxi G
a
i ≤mini Gsi in part (a). In fact, any G that satisﬁes this criterion
must be an equilibrium, explaining its multiplicity. To see why no other type of equilibrium can arise under the condition 
in part (a), suppose, for instance, that G < maxi G
a
i were an equilibrium. Then everyone would be giving above the average,
with at least one exceeding it, which would be inconsistent with the deﬁnition of the average. More intuitively, multiple 
norm-conforming equilibria exist when donors are not too heterogeneous across preferences and incomes. Otherwise, among 
suﬃciently heterogeneous donors, it is not surprising that there will be a unique expectation as to who gives above and 
who gives below the average, which accounts for the equilibrium uniqueness in part (b).36
Two major insights can be gleaned from Proposition 9. First, heterogeneous donors may all choose to give the same 
(average) amount in equilibrium. Thus, much like in Bernheim’s (1994) theory of conformity but in a very different setting, 
an endogenous social norm for giving emerges.37 Second, in order to prevent donors from coordinating at a low average, 
the fundraiser has a clear incentive to suggest a donation as a focal point. Proposition 9 predicts that such suggestions are 
more likely to be observed for the fundraiser whose donor base is not too heterogeneous; e.g., universities and religious 
organizations.38
36 The norm-conformity identiﬁed in Proposition 9(a) would also be less pronounced if, as mentioned in Footnote 12, there were some positive utility
from giving above the norm, which, by weakening the free-riding incentive, would cause an upward shift in the altruistic reaction Rai (G) and thus an 
increase in the threshold G
a
i in Fig. 2.
37 In his extension of Bernheim, Gillen (2015) assumes the social norm to be the average action. Interestingly, no such assumption is needed in our setting
because if a social norm is to emerge in equilibrium, it must, by deﬁnition, be the average donation.
38 Another commonly suggested social norm for giving, especially by religious organizations, is a ﬁxed percentage of income, e.g., “tithing” or the ten
percent rule. By personalizing the suggested gift, a percentage rule is likely to increase social giving and the total contribution (as argued in Footnote 21)
but it is unlikely to emerge endogenously among heterogeneous donors. To see this, let the social cost for person i be: v̂ i(gi) = si max{λwi − gi , 0}, for 
some λ ∈ (0, 1). If λwi > gr for all i, then, by Proposition 1, Gs,∗ is higher than that for a ﬁxed norm, gr . Next, suppose that in equilibrium, gs,∗ = λ∗wi
for all i. Then, from (7), we must have that
λ∗ = 1− φ
s
i (G
s,∗; si) − Gs,∗
,wi
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6. Conclusion
To summarize, our investigation has produced the following testable hypotheses (some of which are already corroborated
by evidence):
1. Compared to anonymous giving, direct solicitations yield less heterogeneous gifts, concentrated around the norm.
[Propositions 1 and 9]
2. The most generous donors prefer direct solicitations while the least generous prefer anonymity. [Proposition 3]
3. As the suggested donation increases, more people give and the total donation increases up to some limit. [Proposi-
tions 1]
4. Very high and very low suggested donations have no marginal effect on giving. [Proposition 6]
5. Under social pressure, an equalizing income redistribution may increase the total donation. [Proposition 7]
6. If the number of donors is large (as in empirical and ﬁeld studies), most donors will avoid the solicitor if they can.
[Proposition 8]
7. Without an explicit norm, the majority of donors give the same – average – amount if they are not too different.
[Proposition 9]
Our analysis points out that regulation of charitable solicitations is likely to be light-handed since they also help mitigate 
the free-rider problem. This is consistent with mild IRS registration requirements for charities and their exemption from the 
popular Do Not Call list. More broadly, our theory provides a possible microfoundation for Andreoni’s (1990) warm-glow 
giving. In particular, whether or not a donor is a pure altruist and/or social giver is determined in equilibrium – rather than 
assumed in preferences. Our analysis also contributes to theories of conformity by showing that an endogenous norm for 
giving can emerge despite no social disapproval for high generosity. The difference in our context is that agents are strategic 
not only to the audience but also to each other.
We believe that our model of voluntary giving may be fruitfully extended to evaluate the role of social incentives in 
tax compliance, as recently evidenced by Dwenger et al. (2016) In particular, whether social and legal sanctions are substi-
tutes or complements is worth investigating. Since fundraisers often compete for limited donor resources, it would also be 
interesting to establish the link between charity competition and social pressure.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Directly follows from preceding arguments in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Summing optimal gifts in (9) over all i, 
∑
i g
s
i (G) = G . Deﬁne (G) =
∑
i g
s
i (G) − G . Since gsi (G)
is continuous and weakly decreasing, (G) is continuous and strictly decreasing in G . Letting k = argmaxi f ai (wi) and 
l = argmaxi Gs,0i , note that
( fk(wk)) = gsk( f ak (wk)) − f ak (wk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
+
∑
i 	=k
gsi ( f
a
k (wk)) ≥ 0.
Moreover, (Gs,0l ) = −Gs,0l < 0. Hence, there is a unique solution Gs,∗ to (G) = 0. Given Gs,∗ , the proﬁle gs,∗i = gsi (Gs,∗) is 
uniquely determined and constitutes an equilibrium by construction.
Next we prove part (b). Suppose gr1 > g
r
2 but G
s,∗
1 < G
s,∗
2 . Then, since, from (9), g
s
i is weakly increasing in g
r and weakly 
decreasing in G , it must be that gs,∗i,1 ≥ gs,∗i,2 for all i, which implies Gs,∗1 ≥ Gs,∗2 – a contradiction. Hence, Gs,∗1 ≥ Gs,∗2 . As a 
corollary, since gr = 0 refers to the altruistic giving, we have Gs,∗ ≥ Ga,∗ .
To prove part (a), suppose ga,∗i < g
s,∗
i but g
s,∗
i > g
r . Then, part (b) and (9) reveal that Ga,∗ ≤ Gs,∗ < Ga,ri and in turn, 
ga,∗i ≥ gs,∗i – a contradiction. Hence, gs,∗i ≤ gr . Finally, suppose ga,∗i ≥ gr . From Lemma 1, Ga,∗ ≤ Ga,ri . Since Gs,∗ ≥ Ga,∗ and 
gsi (G) is weakly decreasing, it follows that g
a,∗
i ≥ gs,∗i , as desired. 
Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 1(a), ga,∗i ≥ gr implies ga,∗i ≥ gs,∗i . Summing over all i, Ga,∗ ≥ Gs,∗ . From Propo-
sition 1(b), Gs,∗ ≥ Ga,∗ , implying Gs,∗ = Ga,∗ . Next suppose 0 < ga,∗i < gr for some i. Then Ga,ri < Ga,∗ < Ga,0i . Since
Ga,0i ≤ Gs,0i by Lemma 1, it follows that Ga,ri < Ga,∗ < Gs,0i , implying gsi (Ga,∗) > ga,∗i . By the equilibrium uniqueness, this 
means Gs,∗ 	= Ga,∗ or equivalently, Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose ga,∗i ≥ gr but, to the contrary, us,∗i ≤ ua,∗i . Then, by Proposition 1(a), ga,∗i ≥ gs,∗i . If gs,∗i ≥ gr , 
then v∗i = 0, which, together with the fact that Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ , implies us,∗i > ua,∗i – a contradiction. If, on the other hand,
which is unlikely to be satisﬁed for all i. For instance, if donors have identical preferences, i.e., φsi = φs , then they must also have identical incomes. The 
issue of which giving norm is more likely to be adopted in a society is interesting and deserves further research.12
gs,∗i < g
r , we show that person i can do strictly better by choosing gsi = gr . To see this, note that gr + Gs,∗−i > Gs,∗ and 
therefore ui(wi − gr, gr + Gs,∗−i ) > ui(wi − ga,∗i , Ga,∗) = ua,∗i as we also know Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ and ga,∗i ≥ gr . Recalling us,∗i ≤ ua,∗i
by hypothesis, it follows that ui(wi − gr, gr + Gs,∗−i ) > us,∗i , contradicting gs,∗i being an equilibrium gift. Hence, us,∗i > ua,∗i , as 
claimed in part (a).
To prove part (b), suppose ga,∗i < g
r and ga,∗j ≥ gr , ∀ j 	= i. From Proposition 1(a), this implies ga,∗j ≥ gs,∗j , ∀ j 	= i and thus 
Ga,∗−i ≥ Gs,∗−i . Since Gs,∗ > Ga,∗ , this also implies ga,∗i < gs,∗i ; in particular, ga,∗i 	= gs,∗i . From here, note that
us,∗i ≤ ui(wi − gs,∗i ,Gs,∗) ≤ ui(wi − gs,∗i ,Ga,∗−i + gs,∗i ) < ui(wi − ga,∗i ,Ga,∗−i + ga,∗i ) = ua,∗i ,
where the last inequality follows from Nash behavior. Hence, us,∗i < u
a,∗
i . 
Proof of Proposition 3. As noted in the text, part (a) follows because ga,∗i > 0 implies g
a,∗
i = wi + Ga,∗ − φa(Ga,∗), which in 
turn implies xa,∗i = φa(Ga,∗) − Ga,∗ = xa,∗ and ua,∗i = u(xa,∗, Ga,∗) = ua,∗ .
To prove part (b), deﬁne the cutoff wealths ws,∗ = φa(Gs,∗) − Gs,∗ and ws,∗∗ = φs(Gs,∗, s) − Gs,∗ . Clearly, ws,∗ > ws,∗∗
since ∂φs(., s)/∂s < 0 and s > 0. Then, using Lemma 1, person i’s equilibrium gift and utility can be respectively written:
gs,∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
wi − ws,∗ if wi > gr + ws,∗
gr if gr + ws,∗∗ < wi ≤ gr + ws,∗
wi − ws,∗∗ if ws,∗∗ < wi ≤ gr + ws,∗∗
0 if wi ≤ ws,∗∗,
(A.1)
and
us,∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
u(ws,∗,Gs,∗) if wi > gr + ws,∗
u(wi − gr,Gs,∗) if gr + ws,∗∗ < wi ≤ gr + ws,∗
u(ws,∗∗,Gs,∗) − s[gr − (wi − ws,∗∗)] if ws,∗∗ < wi ≤ gr + ws,∗∗
u(wi,Gs,∗) − sgr if wi ≤ ws,∗∗.
(A.2)
From (A.2), it is obvious that us,∗i ≥ us,∗j if and only if wi ≥ w j . Part (c) is immediate from (a) and (b). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose ci > si gr for all i and that G∗∗ is a sorting equilibrium in which donor i avoids the 
fundraiser. Then, g∗∗i < g
r . Letting gsi be i’s best response to G
∗∗
−i under social pressure, the following must hold
ui(wi − g∗∗i ,G∗∗) − ci ≥ ui(wi − gsi , gsi + G∗∗−i) −max{si(gr − gsi ),0}
≥ ui(wi − g∗∗i ,G∗∗) −max{si(gr − g∗∗i ),0}.
Since g∗∗i < g
r , this implies si(gr − g∗∗i ) ≥ ci , which contradicts ci > si gr . Thus, it is a dominant strategy for each donor to 
give through the fundraiser, yielding G∗∗ = Gs,∗ .
To prove the second part, suppose that ga,∗i < g
r and that donor i avoids the fundraiser and contributes g∗∗i in a sorting 
equilibrium. Then, g∗∗i < g
r and he is better off than contributing gsi ≤ gr by seeking the fundraiser, i.e., ui(x∗∗i , G∗∗) − ci ≥
ui(wi − gsi , G∗∗−i + gsi ) − si(gr − gsi ). Re-arranging terms,
ci ≤ ui(x∗∗i ,G∗∗) − ui(wi − gsi ,G∗∗−i + gsi ) + si(gr − gsi ) ≡ i (A.3)
Note that i > 0 because the difference in ui ’s on the r.h.s. of (A.3) is nonnegative due to strict quasi-concavity and because 
either gsi = gr(	= g∗∗i ) or gsi < gr . Hence, there is a suﬃciently small ci > 0 such that it is indeed a best response for donor 
i to avoid the fundraiser. Suppose this is the case for all donors whose voluntary gifts satisfy ga,∗i < g
r . Then, the sorting 
equilibrium cannot yield a higher total contribution, i.e., G∗∗ ≤ Ga,∗ . If ga,∗i ≥ gr for some donor, then G∗∗ ≤ Gsi . This would 
imply an optimal pressure gift g∗∗i ≥ gr and in turn g∗∗i = g∗i . For any ci > 0, such a donor is strictly better off seeking the 
fundraiser. Since social pressure is not binding for any donor, Ga,∗ is the resulting provision in equilibrium. 
To prove Proposition 5, we ﬁrst prove two claims for a publicly observable S and then deﬁne and establish equilibrium 
for an unobservable S .
As in the text, suppose u(x, G) is additively separable, i.e., uxG = 0. Then, the strict quasi-concavity of u(.) and the strict 
normality of public and private goods require that uxx < 0 and uGG < 0. Let S ⊆ N be the set of donors that the fundraiser
solicits. Each solicitation costs ε > 0 to the fundraiser. Let g∗i (S) and G
∗(S) =∑i∈N g∗i (S) be the individual and aggregate
gifts in equilibrium.
Claim A.1. Fix S. Then G∗(S) ≤ G∗(S ∪ {i}).13
Proof. Fix S and let S ′ = S ∪ {i}. For i ∈ S , the result is trivial. Suppose i /∈ S and by way of contradiction, G∗(S) > G∗(S ′). 
We exhaust two possibilities. The ﬁrst is that g∗i (S
′) ≤ gr . Then, by Lemma 1, g∗i (S ′) = min
{
Rsi (G
∗(S ′)), gr
}
. Moreover,
since i /∈ S , person i makes a purely altruistic gift when the set of solicitations is S; namely g∗i (S) = Rai (G∗(S)). Note that 
Rai (G
∗(S)) ≤ min{Rsi (G∗(S)), gr} ≤ min{Rsi (G∗(S ′)), gr} = g∗i (S ′) and hence g∗i (S) ≤ g∗i (S ′). On the other hand, for j ∈ S , 
we have g∗j (S) = min
{
Rsj(G
∗(S)), gr
}
≤ min
{
Rsj(G
∗(S ′)), gr
}
= g∗j (S ′) if g∗j (S) ≤ gr , and g∗j (S) = Rai (G∗(S)) < Rai (G∗(S ′)) ≤
g∗j (S
′) if g∗j (S) > g
r . Summing up the contributions in the two sets, we ﬁnd G∗(S) ≤ G∗(S ′) – a contradiction. The sec-
ond possibility is that g∗i (S
′) > gr . Then g∗i (S
′) = Rai (G∗(S ′)), which, given G∗(S) > G∗(S ′), implies g∗i (S) < g∗i (S ′). Again 
summing up contributions, we ﬁnd G∗(S) < G∗(S ′) – a contradiction. Hence, G∗(S) ≤ G∗(S ′). 
Claim A.2. Fix S and suppose that g∗k (S) > 0 for every k ∈ S who does not avoid the fundraiser. If i ∈ S does not avoid the fundraiser, 
then neither does a richer individual j ∈ S.
Proof. Consider individual i ∈ S who does not avoid the fundraiser. If g∗i (S) > gr , then a richer individual j ∈ S will con-
tribute altruistically whether or not he avoids the fundraiser. To save on the cost of avoidance, however, j ∈ S will give 
through the fundraiser. Next suppose that g∗i (S) ≤ gr and let
u∗i (S) ≡ u(wi − g∗i (S),G∗(S)) − v(g∗i (S))
and
udi (S) ≡maxgi u(wi − gi, gi + G
∗
−i(S)) − c,
be i’s respective equilibrium utilities from giving through the fundraiser and through unilaterally sorting out. To establish
the claim, it suﬃces to show that the incentive to sort out is weakly decreasing in income, i.e., ∂
∂wi
[
u∗i (S) − udi (S)
] ≥ 0.
First suppose, in addition, that g∗i (S) 	= gr . Then, by Lemma 1,
g∗i (S) = wi + G∗(S) − φs(G∗(S), s). (A.4)
Hence,
u∗i (S) = u(φs(G∗(S), s) − G∗(S),G∗(S)) − s(gr − (wi + G∗(S) − φs(G∗(S), s))).
Clearly, ∂
∂wi
u∗i (S) = s. Now we determine ∂∂wi udi (S). Suppose that individual i contributes some after sorting out. From (A.4), 
we know that G∗−i(S) ≡ G∗(S) − g∗i (S) = φs(G∗(S), s) − wi . Therefore, i’s deviation – and purely altruistic – contribution is 
gdi = f a(wi + G∗−i(S)) − G∗−i(S) = f a(φs(G∗(S), s)) − [φs(G∗(S), s) − wi], yielding utility:
udi (S) = u(φs(Gs,∗, s) − f a(φs(Gs,∗, s)), f a(φs(Gs,∗, s)).
Note that ∂
∂wi
udi (S) = 0 and in turn, ∂∂wi
[
u∗i (S) − udi (S)
] = s ≥ 0. Now suppose that individual i contributes nothing after
sorting out. Then, ∂
∂wi
udi (wi, φ
s(G∗(S), s) − wi) = ux − uG < ∂∂wi u∗i (S), where the inequality is due to strict quasi-concavity 
of u(x, G). Hence, ∂
∂wi
[
u∗i (S) − udi (S)
]≥ 0, as required. To complete the proof, suppose ﬁnally that g∗i (S) = gr . Then u∗i (S) =
u(wi − gr, gr + G∗−i(S)) and by deﬁnition, udi (S) = max0≤gi≤wi u(wi − gi, gi + G∗−i(S)) − c. Together, ∂∂wi
[
u∗i (S) − udi (S)
]=
ux(wi − gr, gr + G∗−i(S)) − ux(wi − gdi , gdi + G∗−i(S)), where the second term follows from the ﬁrst-order condition if gdi = 0
or from the Envelope Theorem if gdi > 0. Since uxG = 0, uxx < 0 and gdi ≤ gr , we have that ∂∂wi
[
u∗i (S) − udi (S)
] ≥ 0, as
desired. 
Deﬁnition A.1 (Equilibrium). We say that (S∗ , {g∗i (S∗)}i∈N , Sof f ) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium if:
1. (Donors) Donor i in S∗ has no unilateral incentive to sort out: u∗i (S
∗) ≥ udi (S∗).
2. (Fundraiser) The fundraiser has no incentive to solicit S 	= S∗ – either because G∗(S) < G∗(S∗) or because G∗(S) =
G∗(S∗) and |S| > |S∗|.
3. (Off-equilibrium beliefs) If i /∈ S∗ and solicited, then he believes that the solicitation set is Sof f = S∗ ∪ {i}. If i ∈ S∗ and
not solicited, then he believes that Sof f = S∗\{i}.
Remark. As discussed in the text, we adopt “passive” off-equilibrium beliefs that are commonly adopted in the bilateral 
contracting literature (e.g., McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).
Lemma A.1. There is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. The solicitation set S∗ is such that (a) i ∈ S∗ if and only if 0 < g∗i (S∗) < gr , (b) if
i, j ∈ S∗ , then l ∈ S∗ whenever wl is between wi and w j, and (c) individual i who is less wealthy than those in S∗ would avoid the 
fundraiser if solicited.14
Proof. Suppose that the solicitor publicly commits to soliciting from the set S that satisﬁes the properties (a), (b), and (c). 
We show that S = S∗ . Let k be the lowest income individual in S . By deﬁnition of S , k does not sort out and by Claim A2, 
neither will others in S . Thus, the proposed set S satisﬁes equilibrium Condition 1. To verify equilibrium Condition 2, note 
that the fundraiser has no incentive to solicit i /∈ S for whom g∗i (S) ≥ gr as social pressure is nonbinding for such a person
and each solicitation costs ε > 0. By the same token, the fundraiser has no incentive to solicit i /∈ S who is a free-rider, i.e., 
g∗i (S) = 0. Conversely, if 0 < g∗i (S) < gr , then i ∈ S because ε > 0 is assumed to be suﬃciently small.
Next, we argue that the fundraiser has no incentive to expand the set S and solicit a lower income individual. Suppose, 
to the contrary, that individual i with wi < wk is solicited. Under the passive beliefs speciﬁed in Condition 3, he conjec-
tures G∗−i(S), which would precisely be the total contribution to which individual i would react if the fundraiser publicly
announced the solicitation set S ∪ {i}. Since individual i would sort out in that case, he would also sort out when the 
solicitation set is unobserved. The fundraiser would, however, not solicit i to save cost ε > 0 – a contradiction. Finally, we 
rule out nonsolicitation of i ∈ S in equilibrium. Note that i ∈ S implies that g∗i (S) = min
{
Rsi (G
∗(S)), gr
}
> 0. If individ-
ual i were not solicited, he would give according to Rai (G
∗(S)) while other individuals would not alter their giving. Since 
g∗i (S) > R
a
i (G
∗(S)), the public good provision strictly decreases. Hence, S = S∗ . 
Proof of proposition 5. The existence of income cutoffs wh and wl follows from Lemma A.1 (equilibrium properties (b) and 
(c)). To prove part (a), suppose, as in the proof of Lemma A.1, that the solicitation set is publicly observable and that the 
cost of avoiding the fundraiser increases from c to c′ . Since S is an equilibrium, u∗i (S) − udi (S) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S . This implies
that donors in S would not sort out under c′ and by Claim A.2, they remain in the (new) solicitation set S ′ , i.e., S ⊆ S ′ , 
proving part (a). Part (b) of Proposition 5 is immediate from part (a) and Claim A.1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. To characterize gs,∗ , ﬁrst note from Lemma 1 that Gs = Gs(gr, s) and it is readily established 
that Gs(gr, s) is continuous in its arguments; strictly decreasing in gr ; and strictly increasing in s. Second, observe 
that Ga,∗ < Gs(ga,∗, s) since s > 0, and Gs( f (w, s), s) = f (w, s). Therefore Gs(gr, s) − ngr = 0 admits a unique solution 
go(s) ∈ (ga,∗, f (w, s)), which is strictly increasing in s. By construction, gs,∗ = gr for ga,∗ ≤ gr < go(s). Next, we show that 
gs,∗ = go(s) for any gr ≥ go(s). Suppose gr ≥ go(s) but, to the contrary, gs,∗ > go(s) (since Gs,∗ = ngs,∗ is increasing in gr
by Proposition 1). Then,
Gs,∗ = ngs,∗ > ngo(s) = Gs(go(s), s) ≥ Gs(gr, s).
Thus, Gs,∗ > Gs(gr, s). From Lemma 1, this implies gs,∗ < go(s) – a contradiction. Hence, gs,∗ = go(s), completing the char-
acterization.
To prove the welfare comparison, recall that the eﬃcient gift solves: ge = argmax0≤g≤w nu(w − g, ng). By strict 
quasi-concavity of u(.), ge is unique and ge ∈ (ga,∗, w). Moreover, ue > ua,∗ . Next, note that the indifference equation: 
u(w − g, ng) = ua,∗ has exactly two solutions, g = ga,∗ and g = gc ∈ (ge, w) such that u(w − g, ng) > ua,∗ if and only if 
g ∈ (ga,∗, gc). By continuity, we know that go(s) → ga,∗ as s → 0, and go(s) → w as s → ∞. This means that we can ﬁnd 
a suﬃciently large s such that go(s) ∈ (gc, w). For such an s, it follows that gs,∗ = gr and thus us,∗ = u(w − gr, ngr) if 
ga,∗ ≤ gr < go(s). Furthermore, us,∗ > ua,∗ if ga,∗ < gr < gc , and us,∗ < ua,∗ if gc < gr , as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst state and prove a claim. As in the proof of Proposition 3, let ws,∗ = φa(Gs,∗) − Gs,∗ and 
ws,∗∗ = φs(Gs,∗, s) − Gs,∗ . Then, gs,∗i is as expressed in (A.1).
Claim A.3. Suppose wi > w j and consider a wealth-equalizing transfer (w ′i, w
′
j) = (wi −, w j +), where  ∈ (0, wi−w j2 ). Then, 
(a) if wi, w j ∈ [gr + ws,∗∗, gr + ws,∗], then the supply of public good is neutral to the transfer; (b) if wi ∈
(
gr + ws,∗∗, gr + ws,∗]
and w j ∈ (ws,∗∗, gr + ws,∗∗), then the supply of the public good strictly increases.
Proof. Part (a) is immediate from (A.1) because both i and j continue to give gr after the transfer. To prove part (b), ﬁrst 
observe that if individual j increased his contribution by  and no one other than i reacted, then by normality, individual 
i would not reduce his gift by exactly . That is, gs,∗
′
i − gs,∗i > −, which implies Gs,∗′ 	= Gs,∗ . Suppose Gs,∗′ < Gs,∗ . Then, 
any individual other than i and j would weakly increase his contribution after the transfer. If w ′i ≥ gr + ws,∗∗′ , then gs,∗
′
i =
gs,∗i = gr , in which case either gs,∗
′
j − gs,∗j = gr − gs,∗j > 0 if w ′j ≥ gr +ws,∗∗′ or gs,∗
′
j − gs,∗j = (w ′j −w j) + (ws,∗∗ −ws,∗∗′) > 0
otherwise. Thus gs,∗
′
j − gs,∗j > 0. Combining we have gs,∗
′
i + gs,∗
′
j > g
s,∗
i + gs,∗j , which implies Gs,∗′ > Gs,∗ – a contradiction. 
If, on the other hand, w ′i < w
∗′ , then gs,∗
′
i − gs,∗i = w ′i − (gr + ws,∗∗) + (ws,∗∗ − ws,∗∗′). Notice that w ′i − (gr + ws,∗∗) > −
and that gs,∗
′
j − gs,∗j =  + (ws,∗∗ − ws,∗∗′). Thus, gs,∗
′
i + gs,∗
′
j > g
s,∗
i + gs,∗j , a contradiction. As a result, it must be that
Gs,∗′ > Gs,∗ , as claimed in part (b). 
Suppose that preferences are identical and that individuals i and j in the population have wealths wi > w j such that 
their altruistic gifts are ga,∗j = 0 < ga,∗i < gr . Then, it follows from Bergstrom et al. (1986; Theorem 5(v)) that under altruistic 
giving, a wealth-equalizing transfer  ∈ (0, wi−w j ] from i to j strictly lowers the public good.2
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Next consider the social pressure setting. It readily follows that for s′ > s, (1) gs,∗i < g
r implies gs
′,∗
i ≥ gs,∗i , with strict 
inequality if gs
′,∗
i > 0; and (2) G
s′,∗ > Gs,∗ . Now consider the same wealth transfer between individuals i and j as in 
altruistic giving. Then, there exist s1 and s2 such that (1) gs,∗j = 0 for s < s1 and gs,∗j > 0 for s ≥ s1; (2) gs,∗i < gr for
s < s2 and gs,∗i = gr for s ≥ s2. Let sL = max
{
s1, s2
}
. For s = sL +  , the continuity of gs,∗i in s implies that wi is in (
gr + ws,∗∗, gr + ws,∗] and w j is in (ws,∗∗, gr + ws,∗∗). Thus, by the part (b) of Claim A3, the supply of the public good 
strictly increases after the transfer. Finally, there clearly exist sh > sl such that g
s,∗
j = gr for any s ≥ sh; in fact, gs,∗j = gs,∗i =
gr for any s ≥ sh . Thus, by part (a) of Claim A3, the supply of the public good is neutral to the transfer. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The limit contribution exists because gi(G) is decreasing and bounded below by 0. Since the limit 
is assumed strictly positive, Lemma 1 implies that gi(G) = min{wi + G − φsi (G; si), gr} for all G ≥ G ′ where G ′ is suﬃ-
ciently large but ﬁnite. Evidently if gi(G) = gr , the conclusion trivially follows. Suppose that gi(G) = wi + G − φsi (G; si). 
Since 0 ≤ gi(G) ≤ wi , it must be that limG→∞ gi(G)G = 0. This requires limG→∞
φsi (G;si)
G = 1 and by l’Hospital’s rule, that 
limG→∞ ∂φsi (G; si)/∂G = 1. Hence, limG→∞ ∂ gi(G)/∂G = 0, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 8. From the deﬁnition of Gs,0(t), note ﬁrst that for any n, type t donors are contributors if and only 
if Gs,∗ < Gs,0(t). To prove part (a), suppose, to the contrary, that as n → ∞, some type t 	= 1 donors remain contributors. 
Then limn→∞ Gs,∗ ≤ Gs,0(t). This implies that type t = 1 donors contribute a strictly positive amount in a limit economy 
and thus Gs,∗ → ∞. But this means type t 	= 1 donors would contribute nothing, yielding a contradiction. By the same 
logic, type 1 donors must be contributors. To prove part (b), we consider two cases. If Gs,0(1) < ∞, then it must be that as 
n → ∞, Gs,∗ → Gs,0(1), which implies gs,∗i → 0. If, on the other hand, Gs,0(1) = ∞, it must be that Gs,∗ → ∞; otherwise, 
Gs,∗ < ∞ would mean type 1 donors contribute positive amounts, generating Gs,∗ → ∞. From here, it is immediate that 
gs,∗i → gi . 
Proof of Lemma 3. Analogous to Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 9. As in the proof of Proposition 1 but now summing optimal gifts in (16), we deﬁne (G) =∑
i g
s
i (G) − G . Clearly, any G that solves (G) = 0 is an equilibrium. It readily follows from Lemma 1 that (1) 
(G) = 0 for G ∈ [maxi Gai , mini Gsi ]; (2) (G) is strictly decreasing for all G /∈ [maxi Gai , mini Gsi ]; and (3) ( f ak (wk)) =∑
i 	=k g
s
i ( f
a
k (wk)) > 0 and (G
s,0
max) = −Gs,0max < 0, where f ak (wk) =maxi f ai (wi) and Gs,0max =maxi Gs,0i . From here, both parts 
(a) and (b) are immediate. 
Appendix B. Social cost
In this appendix, we argue that all of our results would continue to hold under a nonlinear and differentiable social cost 
function:
vi(gi) = zi(max{gr − gi,0}), (B.1)
where z′i(y) > 0 and z
′′
i (y) > 0, with zi(0) = z′i(0) = 0. As in (4), person i solves
max
G≥G−i
ui(wi + G−i − G,G) − zi(gr − (G − G−i)).
For G > G−i , the ﬁrst-order condition is
d
dG
ui(wi + G−i − G,G) + z′i(gr + G−i − G) = 0. (B.2)
The second-order condition is satisﬁed because ui(.) is strictly quasi-concave and z′′i (.) > 0. Let the solution to (B.2) be
G = f si (wi + G−i, gr + G−i), (B.3)
where normality of public and private goods imply partial derivatives: 0 < f si1 ≤ θ < 1 and f si2 > 0.39 Similar to Andreoni
(1990), assume that 0 < f si1 + f si2 < 1 so both altruistic and social pressure motives for giving are present. Inverting (B.3), 
we have that G−i = φsi (G, wi, gr), implying the social gift:
gi = G − φsi (G,wi, gr) ≡ Rsi (G).
Using (B.3),
39 As noted in Footnote 9, the existence of parameter θ is for technical convenience.16
∂φsi
∂G
= 1
f si1 + f si2
> 1,
∂φsi
∂wi
= − f
s
i1
f si1 + f si2
∈ (−1,0),
∂φsi
∂ gr
= − f
s
i2
f si1 + f si2
∈ (−1,0),
and in turn,
∂Rsi
∂G
< 0,
∂Rsi
∂wi
> 0,and
∂Rsi
∂ gr
> 0.
As mentioned above, all of our results would hold under (B.1). Speciﬁcally, Propositions 1 and 2 would follow because 
∂Rsi /∂G < 0 and ∂R
s
i /∂ g
r > 0. In the proof of Proposition 3, simply deﬁne wealth cutoffs: Ga,∗ − φs(Ga,∗, wa, 0) = gr and 
Gs,∗ − φs(Gs,∗, ws, gr) = gr . Under the linear social cost, these cutoffs reduce to: wa = gr + ws,∗ and ws = gr + ws,∗∗ in 
(A.1). The proof of Proposition 4 would obtain because zi(0) = 0 and z′i(y) > 0 for y > 0 so that gs,∗i < gr implies a positive
social cost and a lower donation, the higher the social cost is. This guarantees that avoiding the fundraiser is optimal if the 
avoidance cost is small. The key to proving Proposition 5 is Claim A.2, which would hold given that zi(0) = 0 and z′i(y) > 0
for y > 0 as well as the assumption of additively separable utility. For Propositions 6 and 7, it would be more convenient to 
parametrize so that zi(y) = si z(y). Finally, the proof of Proposition 9 exploits the fact that ∂Rsi /∂G < 0 for G /∈ [G
a
i , G
s
i ].
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